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Good morning,  
 
First, before starting my presentation about the protection of women in 
international criminal law, I will like to thank the colleagues who have 
put together this summer school and the opportunity that has been given 
to me to present my study in this fora.  
 
The understanding and treatment in International Criminal law of sexual 
or gender crimes can only be described with a term that is far from 
international law, and that is REVOLUTION. In international law, 
changes are often a matter of time, and time passes in slow motion. 
 
But the treatment of gender crimes has completely change in a matter of 
70 years of history of international criminal law. From the silence and 
omission during the Nuremberg and Tokyo proceedings to the 
development of an independent category of crimes against humanity and 
war crimes. We, scholars, can only assert that the evolution has been 
outstanding. It is true that a lot of things can be done different and that 
the treatment of victims in international proceedings can change, but the 
definition of crimes, that first step to end impunity, has been remarkable.  
 
In this presentation I will try to expose such evolution-revolution, from 
the first crimes codified in the international statutes till the present time 
represented by the Rome Statute for an International Criminal Court.  
 
As I have mentioned before, neither the Nuremberg Tribunal nor its Asian 
counterpart, the Tokyo Tribunal, addressed the numerous sexual crimes 
committed during World War II. As such, the Statutes of the Tribunals 
did not contain an express prohibition condemning rape or the practices 
of enforce prostitution/sexual slavery. They were all situations covered 
by provisions related to family honor or ill treatment. And therefore, the 
sexual slavery of the “comfort wives” in the Japanese front or the rapes 




After World War II, the treaties codifying the laws of war –the IV Geneva 
Conventions- inhered the silence of the prosecutions. And again, not even 
rape was expressly include in the grave breaches provisions. There are 
mentions to ill-treatment and honor, but the sexual crimes continued to 
be ignore. Only the IV Geneva Convention included a provision, article 
27, which recognized that: 
 
Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their 
honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any 
form of indecent assault”.  
 
But this provision was not included into the grave breaches provision. 
And therefore, there were not considered as independent war crimes.  
 
During the next decades the international community started developing 
treaties and conventions related to human rights and different 
international crimes.  
 
The first one was the Genocide Convention of 1948. The genocide 
convention included a provision covering the so-called reproductive 
violence (imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group) 
and two acts that could implicitly covered other forms of sexual violence 
(causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; and 
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part).  
 
Other international instruments for the development of human rights 
included among their prohibed practices some of the actual gender 
crimes, but none of them defined specific crimes to be persecute under 




As an example, The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of 
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery 
of 1956 included among the definition of “slavery” a practice that could 
be assimilated to the future crime of “forced marriage” but the criminal 
sanctions were to be established under national law, urging states parties 
“to encourage the use of facilities whereby the consent of both parties to 
a marriage may be freely expressed in the presence of a competent civil 
or religious authority” as a mean to ensure voluntarily of the bond. 
 
This situation underwent a first overturn with the constitution of the ad 
hoc international criminal tribunals of Yugoslavia and Rwanda during the 
1990s, which expressly included different forms of gender crimes. 
 
As is known, during the earlies 1990s, the international community 
witnessed scenes of unimaginable violence, both in the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In both conflicts, mass rapes, sexual torture, 
sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence were widespread and 
systematic and the international community decided to put an end on 
such impunity. 
 
The Statute of the ICTY included for the first time the crime of rape as a 
crime against humanity and the genocidal conducts of reproductive 
violence, that we have mentioned before. The Statute of the ICTR included 
the previous ones and added the war crimes of rape, enforced prostitution 
and any form of indecent assault, as a violation of art. 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II of the Geneva 
Conventions. 
 
Despite such provisions the prosecutors of the ad hoc tribunals initially 
did not proceed to include them in the indictments. 
 
But then, the Akayesu case started at the ICTR and the change began. In 
1997, and after the testimonies of two witnesses who spoke of multiple 
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rapes, the Prosecutor of the ICTR amended the indictment against Jean 
Paul Akayesu including rape and sexual violence as part of the counts of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Prosecutors in 
both ad hoc tribunals started to use the provisions on sexual violence 
with different views, permitting the establishment of a corpus of case law 
defining different sexual crimes. 
 
Rape was the first crime to be defined in the case law of these tribunals.  
 
The Akayesu case was, as mentioned, a starting point for the case law 
regarding sexual crimes, and specially, rape. The Trial Chamber, in its 
1998 Judgment, defined rape as a crime against humanity and as an act 
of genocide for the first time in international criminal law, establishing 
its legal elements and boundaries. 
 
For the Trial Chamber: 
“(…) while rape has been historically defined in national jurisdictions as 
non-consensual sexual intercourse, variations on the form of rape may 
include acts which involve the insertion of objects and/or the use of bodily 
orifices not considered to be intrinsically sexual. (…) 
 
The Tribunal considers that rape is a form of aggression and that the 
central elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical 
description of objects and body parts. The Tribunal also notes the cultural 
sensitivities involved in public discussion of intimate matters and recalls 
the painful reluctance and inability of witnesses to disclose graphic 
anatomical details of sexual violence they endured. The United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment does not catalogue specific acts in its definition 
of torture, focusing rather on the conceptual framework of state-sanctioned 
violence. The Tribunal finds this approach more useful in the context of 
international law. Like torture, rape is used for such purposes as 
intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control 
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or destruction of a person. Like torture, rape is a violation of personal 
dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when it is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity. 
 
The Tribunal defines rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, 
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. The 
Tribunal considers sexual violence, which includes rape, as any act of a 
sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which 
are coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the 
human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even 
physical contact. (…) The Tribunal notes in this context that coercive 
circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force. Threats, 
intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or 
desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in 
certain circumstances, such as armed conflict or the military presence of 
Interahamwe among refugee Tutsi women at the bureau communal. Sexual 
violence falls within the scope of "other inhumane acts", set forth Article 3(i) 
of the Tribunal's Statute, "outrages upon personal dignity," set forth in 
Article 4(e) of the Statute, and "serious bodily or mental harm," set forth in 
Article 2(2)(b) of the Statute”.  
 
This first international definition of the crime of rape –that is “a physical 
invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances 
which are coercive”- put all the emphasis in the coactive element that 
was highlighted by the use of terms as “invasion” and “coercive”.  
 
But the Akayesu definition was almost coincident in time with another 
definition of rape- this time by one of the ICTY’s Trial Chamber; the one 
laid down on the Furundžija case. The ICTY Trial Chamber, after 
affirming that no definition of rape could be found under international 
law, and reviewing both the case law and national criminal codes, 




“Thus, the Trial Chamber finds that the following may be accepted as the 
objective elements of rape: (i) the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of 
the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other 
object used by the perpetrator; or (b) the mouth of the victim by the penis 
of the perpetrator; (ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the 
victim or a third person”. 
 
So, in 1998, International Criminal law found itself with two case-law 
definitions of rape, and a long path ahead. The division between trial 
chambers was real, and each one applied the definition as its own will.   
 
The Judgment in the Kunarac et al. case came to clarify the second 
element of the Furundžija definition: the element of force, rejecting that 
only force, threat of force or coercion could render an act of sexual 
penetration as non-consensual, and including other factors that 
influence a victim’s free will to consent. The element of force was replace 
by the “lack of consent of the victim”. The Chamber considered that: 
 
“(…) the actus reus of the crime of rape in international law is constituted 
by: the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the 
victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the 
perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; 
where such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. 
Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of 
the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding 
circumstances. The mens rea is the intention to effect this sexual 
penetration, and the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the 
victim”.  
 
The Appeals Chamber in the case went further in clarifying the elements 
of rape, and especially the ones related to “lack of consent”. For the 
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Appeals Chamber, it was worth to highlight two points, points that have 
been brought to these days’ prosecutions of rape in other jurisdictions: 
 
“First, it rejects the Appellants’ «resistance» requirement, an addition for 
which they have offered no basis in customary international law. The 
Appellants’ bald assertion that nothing short of continuous resistance 
provides adequate notice to the perpetrator that his attentions are 
unwanted is wrong in law and absurd on the facts. Secondly, with regard 
to the role of force in the definition of rape, the Appeals Chamber notes that 
the Trial Chamber appeared to depart from the Tribunal’s prior definitions 
of rape. However, in explaining its focus on the absence of consent as the 
condition sine qua non of rape, the Trial Chamber did not disavow the 
Tribunal’s earlier jurisprudence, but instead sought to explain the 
relationship between force and consent. Force or threat of force provides 
clear evidence of no consent, but force is not an element per se of rape. In 
particular, the Trial Chamber wished to explain that there are “factors other 
than force which would render an act of sexual penetration non-consensual 
or non-voluntary on the part of the victim”. A narrow focus on force or threat 
of force could permit perpetrators to evade liability for sexual activity to 
which the other party had not consent by taking advantage of coercive 
circumstances without relying on physical force. (…) While it is true that a 
focus on one aspect gives a different shading to the offence, it is worth 
observing that the circumstances giving rise to the instant appeal and that 
prevail in most cases charged as either war crimes or crimes against 
humanity will be almost universally coercive. That is to say, true consent 
will not be possible”. 
 
 
The Kunarac definition was followed by the majority of the decisions 
containing the charge of rape (whether as war crime or as a crime against 
humanity). But both definitions, as stated by the ICTR, were not 
incompatible or substantially different, as one can complete the other, 
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permitting the Chambers to endorse the conceptual definition in Akayesu 
with the elements set out in Kunarac.  
 
At this point, no one doubted that rape was a crime against humanity or 
a war crime by its own merits. But the acts of rape were conceived by the 
Chambers not only as a crime themselves but also as an act that could 
be covered by other crimes such as torture, persecution, enslavement, 
terrorism and, for the first time, part of the crime of crimes, genocide: 
 
“With regard, particularly, to (…) rape and sexual violence, the Chamber 
wishes to underscore the fact that in its opinion, they constitute genocide 
in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the 
specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted 
as such. Indeed, rape and sexual violence certainly constitute infliction of 
serious bodily and mental harm on the victims and are even, according to 
the Chamber, one of the worst ways of inflict harm on the victim as he or 
she suffers both bodily and mental harm. In light of all the evidence before 
it, the Chamber is satisfied that the acts of rape and sexual violence 
described above, were committed solely against Tutsi women, many of 
whom were subjected to the worst public humiliation, mutilated, and raped 
several times, often in public, in the Bureau Communal premises or in other 
public places, and often by more than one assailant. These rapes resulted 
in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families 
and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the process 
of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically 
contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as 
a whole”. 
 
“Sexual assault” was the other type of sexual category which definition 
was developed in the case law of both tribunals, intending to cover other 





It is then a broader crime than rape and encompasses “all serious abuses 
of a sexual nature inflicted upon the physical and moral integrity of a 
person by means of coercion, threat of force or intimidation in a way that 
is humiliating and degrading for the victim’s dignity”. 
 
The Trial Chamber in the Sainović et al. Judgment identified the elements 
of sexual assault as follows 
 
(a) The physical perpetrator commits an act of a sexual nature on another; 
this includes requiring that other person to perform such an act. 
(b) That act infringes the victim’s physical integrity or amounts to an 
outrage to the victim’s personal dignity. 
(c) The victim does not consent to the act. 
(d) The physical perpetrator intentionally commits the act. 
(e) The physical perpetrator is aware that the act occurred without the 
consent of the victim. 
 
Even if it is evident that sexual assault requires that an act of a sexual 
nature take place, physical contact is, however, not required for an act to 
be qualified as sexual in nature. As stated by the Appeals Chamber in the 
Đorđević case: 
 
“forcing a person to perform or witness certain acts may be sufficient, so 
long as the acts humiliate and/or degrade the victim in a sexual manner”.  
 
As happened with the crime of rape, sexual assaults could be part of other 
types of crimes, such as persecution or torture, or be persecuted under 
the “other inhumane acts” provision.  
 
But the work of the ICTR-ICTY was not the only one covering sexual 
crimes. The Statute of SCSL went a step forward in their prosecution. Its 




“The Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who 
committed the following crimes as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against any civilian population: g. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence”.  
 
It is necessary to bear in mind that this Statute was designed after the 
Rome Statute –were the discussions about gender crimes concluded on a 
specific provision including the previous independent crimes, both as 
crimes against humanity and war crimes.  
 
The main accomplishment regarding sexual crimes of the SCSL was the 
indictment and persecution of the first international cases of the practice 
of “forced marriages” as a crime against humanity. But its practice was 
highly controversial. 
 
In the first case, the AFCR Case, the Prosecutor sustained that the 
practice of “forced marriages” had to be qualified as a crime against 
humanity of sexual slavery and any other form of sexual violence (count 
7-article 2.g. of the Statute) and as a crime against humanity of other 
inhumane act (count 8-article 2.i. of the Statute), or in the alternative as 
a crime or war of outrages upon personal dignity as a violation of article 
3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (count 
9-article 3.e. of the Statute).  
After the dismissal of count 7 for its duplicity, Trial Chamber II studied 
its qualification as a crime against humanity of other inhumane acts in 
count 8, affirming that, based in its residual character, this category 
should be restrictively interpreted as applying only to acts of a non-sexual 
nature amounting to an affront to human dignity and that it had to 
comply with three additional requirements: 
 
“1. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act;  
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2. The act was of a gravity similar to the acts referred to in Article 2(a) to 
(h) of the Statute; and 
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established 
the character of the gravity of the act”. 
 
Trial Chamber II dismissed the charge after affirming that is was not 
satisfied that the evidence was capable of establishing the elements of a 
non-sexual crime of “forced marriage” independent of the crime of sexual 
slavery. 
 
Both the defence and the Prosecutor appeal the Judgment, which allowed 
the Appeals Chamber to reconsider some of the decisions taken by the 
Trial Chamber. 
 
Regarding the Trial Chamber's dismissal of Count 8 ("other Inhumane 
Acts"), the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber erred in law 
by finding that the category of “other inhumane acts” had to be 
restrictively interpreted. Furthermore, it did not see a reason justifying 
why the “exhaustive” listing of sexual crimes under Article 2.g. of the 
Statute should foreclose the possibility of charging as "Other Inhumane 
Acts" crimes which may among others have a sexual or gender 
component. 
 
The Appeals Chamber continued holding that the trial record contained 
ample evidence that the perpetrators of forced marriage intended to 
impose a forced conjugal association upon the victims rather than 
exercise an ownership interest and that forced marriage is not 
predominantly a sexual crime. The Appeals Chamber concluded that:  
 
“Based on the evidence on record, the Appeals Chamber finds that no 
tribunal could reasonably have found that forced marriage was subsumed 
in the crime against humanity of sexual slavery. While forced marriage 
shares certain elements with sexual slavery such as non-consensual sex 
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and deprivation of liberty, there are also distinguishing factors. First, 
forced marriage involves a perpetrator compelling a person by force or 
threat of force, through the words or conduct of the perpetrator or those 
associated with him, into a forced conjugal association with another person 
resulting in great suffering, or serious physical or mental injury on the part 
of the victim. Second, unlike sexual slavery, forced marriage implies a 
relationship of exclusivity between the «husband» and «wife», which could 
lead to disciplinary consequences for breach of this exclusive arrangement. 
These distinctions imply that forced marriage is not predominantly a sexual 
crime. The Trial Chamber, therefore, erred in holding that the evidence of 
forced marriages is subsumed in the elements of sexual slavery.  
 
In light of the distinctions between forced marriage and sexual slavery, the 
Appeals Chamber finds that in the context of the Sierra Leone conflict, 
forced marriage describes a situation in which the perpetrator through his 
words or conduct, or those of someone for whose actions he is responsible, 
compels a person by force, threat of force, or coercion to serve as a conjugal 
partner resulting in severe suffering, or physical, mental or psychological 
injury to the victim”. 
 
As to the opinion of the Appeals Chamber, those practices amounting to 
forced marriages were of similar gravity to several of the crimes against 
humanity enumerated in the Statute and the forceful abduction and use 
of women and girls as forced conjugal partners as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack against the civilian population definitely constitute 
a crime against humanity of “other inhumane acts”.  
 
This controversial interpretation of sexual slavery and forced marriages 
as different crimes was followed by the Prosecutor Office in the RUF Case, 
but was later abandoned in the last case heard by the Court: the case in 





The indictment in the Taylor Case contemplated that the practices of 
“forced marriages” could only be charged as crimes against humanity of 
sexual slavery (count 5) and violations of common Article 3 (outrages 
upon personal dignity-count 6), abandoning the separate crime against 
humanity of other inhumane acts.  
 
In the Trial Chamber's view, the Prosecution erred in various indictments 
by charging "forced marriage" as a crime that falls within the scope of the 
crime against humanity of other inhumane acts. Aiming to refute the case 
law laid down by the Appeals Chamber in the AFRC Appeals Judgement 
and the RUF Case, the Trial Chamber II started its analysis of the now-
called “forced conjugal association” affirming that this practice satisfies 
the two elements required by the crime of sexual slavery (deprivation of 
liberty and the non-consensual sexual acts). And as such, it should 
rather be considered a conjugal form of enslavement. For Trial Chamber 
II, these “forced conjugal associations” constituted a form of enslavement 
in that the perpetrator exercised the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over their "bush wives" and imposed on them a deprivation of 
liberty, causing them to engage in sexual acts as well as other acts. 
Finally, the Chamber declared: “The Trial Chamber is of the view that the 
conjugal slavery best describes these acts, and while they may constitute 
more than sexual slavery, they nevertheless satisfy the elements of sexual 
slavery”.  
 
Even though these decisions of SCSL abandoned the treatment as a crime 
against humanity of “other inhumane acts”, the ECCC has again 
reopened the old approach considering that forced marriages should be 
included in the residual provision.  
 
 
During the negotiations of the Rome Statute, it was make clear that 
gender and sexual crimes needed a special provision. The case law 
established by the ICTY and ICTR led to important developments that 
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were included in the debates of the Preparatory Committees for the Rome 
Conference between 1996 and 1998, as well as in the Conference of Rome 
itself, high lightening the major problem about prosecuting crimes of 
sexual nature: the inexistence of a separate and autonomous category of 
these crimes in the Statutes of the international criminal tribunals. And 
for the first time, different forms of sexual violence were included in the 
articles dedicated to crimes against humanity and war crimes.  
 
As such, the following crimes were included: Rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other 
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity”. 
 
Regarding the crime of rape, the DEC has determined the following 
elements for the conduct: 
1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in 
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the 
perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the 
victim with any object or any other part of the body. 
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, 
such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological 
oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or 
by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was 
committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent. 
 
As can be easily point out, the DEC endorses the case law of the ICTY-
ICTR regarding this crime. The definition of rape posses no further 
questions for the future prosecutions under the ICC Statute, having 
reached a status of customary international law.  
 
2. Sexual Slavery 
Even if the crime of sexual slavery is not new, the position of the ICC 
regarding the crime will be crucial in order to clarify whether the practice 
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of “force marriages” falls into this crime or is left to the “other inhumane 
acts” provision.  
 
To this date, the OTP has included this crime (whether as a crime against 
humanity or as a war crime) under seven cases: KATANGA case; 
KENYATTA case; KONY et al case; NTAGANDA case; NGUDJOLO CHUI 
case; ONGWEN case, and AL HASSAN case. But only in the Katanga and 
Ngudjolo case the Chamber has reached a judgment on the charge of 
sexual slavery. 
 
Under the DEC, the elements that define the crime are:  
 “1. The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right 
of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, 
lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a 
similar deprivation of liberty. 
2. The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more 
acts of a sexual nature”.  
 
Regarding the first element (the exercise of powers attaching to the right 
of ownership over one or more persons), the Chambers have agreed that 
in determining such element, they have to considered various factors 
collectively and that they do “not consider that in the absence of other 
factors, mere imprisonment or its duration are sufficient to satisfy the 
element of ownership over the victim of the crime of sexual slavery”.  
 
The enumeration contained in the DEC is not an exhaustive list, as the 
“right of ownership” and the powers attaching to it may take many forms. 
For the Trial Chamber, this element “must be construed as the use, 
enjoyment and disposal of a person who is regarded as property, by 
placing him or her in a situation of dependence which entails his or her 




The second element is of special importance as is the one that allows the 
conduct to be individualize from the general category of “enslavement”, 
which is another type of crime. The sexual nature of the act will be 
considered under a case by case basis.   
 
As it has been advance, the case law of the ICC will be clarifying the 
position of the practice of the so-called “forced marriages”. It is necessary 
to highlight that the OTP and the Trial Chambers have followed a similar 
path that the one started by the SCSL: in the first cases, both the OTP 
and the Pre-Trial Chambers decided to include the practice under the 
sexual slavery charge, but this interpretation has changed in the case 
against Dominic Ongwen. 
 
After analyzing the international case law regarding such practices, Pre-
Trial Chamber II concluded that the crimes of sexual slavery and forced 
marriage are different. For Pre-Trial Chamber I, the crime of forced 
marriage has a distinct conduct, a distinct harm and protects different 
interests that the crime of sexual slavery, even though they are usually 
connected as a matrioska: one containing the other.  
 
The central elements in the crime of forced marriage are the imposition 
of the “marriage” on the victim and the element of exclusivity of such 
conjugal union, which could lead to disciplinary consequences for breach 
of this arrangement. It is not important whether the union is recognized 
under the applicable national law, as the core element is the imposition 
of such union on the victim.  
 
The protected interest, as mention above, on both crimes is different too. 
In the case of the crime of forced marriage, the conduct violates the basic 
right to consensually marry and establish a family, right that cannot be 
suspended in times of armed conflict. And in the protection of such 
interest is where the victims could suffer different harms summed up to 
the ones describe and contained in other crimes described at the Statute. 
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In the case of “sexual slavery”, the aim of such prosecution is the 
protection of two fundamental human rights: the physical and sexual 
integrity, and the personal liberty of the victim. 
 
This interpretation of the crime has been maintained in the last case 
brought to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s attention, that is, the Al Hassad Case.  
 
The rest of the crimes have not been part on any indictment so far, and for 
that we can only rely in the DEC for establishing their elements.  
The crime of forced prostitution will need to elements:  
1. The perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in one or more 
acts of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as 
that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological 
oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another 
person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s 
or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent.  
2. The perpetrator or another person obtained or expected to obtain 
pecuniary or other advantage in exchange for or in connection with the acts 
of a sexual nature. 
 
Under these elements, the DEC has included the evolution of the concept 
of “lack of consent” and the necessary advantage that has to be obtain in 
connection or in exchange of the acts of sexual nature. The sexual nature 
of the acts will be asses under a case-by-case basis, following the 
Đorđević appeal judgment findings1.  
 
Regarding Forced pregnancy, it is defined as “the unlawful confinement of 
a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic 
composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of 
international law”.  
 
                                                          
1 Vide note 54. 
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The definition establishes a specific intent (mens rea) for this crime: the 
intent of affecting the ethnic composition of a population or carry out 
other grave violation of international law. Such intent applies to the 
confinement and not to the pregnancy itself or to its outcome.  
 
Enforced sterilization protects the right to the biological reproductive 
capacity. The elements describe by the DEC are two: 
1. The perpetrator deprived one or more persons of biological reproductive 
capacity. 
2. The conduct was neither justified by the medical or hospital treatment 
of the person or persons concerned nor carried out with their genuine 
consent. 
 
Finally, the residual provision intents to close the enumeration with an 
open provision of “Any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity”, 
that could be assimilated to the “sexual assaults” of ICTY.  
The elements of such crimes will be: 
1. The perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against 
one or more persons or caused such person or persons to 
engage in an act of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force 
or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, 
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against 
such person or persons or another person, or by taking 
advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or 
persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent.  
2. Such conduct was of a gravity comparable to the other 
offences in article 7, paragraph 1 (g), of the Statute.  
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that 
established the gravity of the conduct.  
 
At this point, scholars and professionals are demanding a new 
interpretation of such provisions, including the trafficking on human 
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beings under the provisions of sexual crimes and a better treatment of 
victims under these prosecutions.  
 
After this presentation, we must conclude that the international 
community has walked a long line to established an international 
definition of one of the first crimes, rape, and that the understanding of 
the rest of sexual crimes is still needed of a more cohesive definition. The 
principles of international criminal law and the rule of law demand such 
cohesion, and so the victims of these crimes. The forgotten crimes are 
now in the public eye of the ICC.  
